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1369 
Article 
Immigration Reform, National Security 
After September 11, and the Future of 
North American Integration 
Kevin R. Johnson† and Bernard Trujillo†† 
Ostensibly to meet the challenge of terrorism after Sep-
tember 11, 2001, but also to soothe the nerves of a tense public, 
the legal terrain surrounding what can be done in the name of 
national security changed dramatically in the United States 
over the last five years. Government, and the public, quickly 
became ready and willing to trade off civil rights—especially 
those of minorities—in the hopes of improving public safety. 
Passed with almost unanimous support in Congress, the USA 
Patriot Act,1 for example, allows for greater intrusion on 
Americans’ civil rights by, among other things, expanding the 
electronic surveillance powers of government.2 In addition, 
President Bush pushed the civil rights envelope with aggres-
 
†  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Law, University of 
California at Davis, Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and Chi-
cana/o Studies. A.B., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Harvard Univer-
sity. University of California at Davis law student Stella Schmidel provided 
much-appreciated research assistance. Both authors thank Tino Cuellar for 
helpful comments. 
†† Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. A.B., Prince-
ton; J.D., Yale University. Copyright © 2007 by Kevin R. Johnson and Bernard 
Trujillo. 
 1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. After much debate, see Jonathan Weisman & Jef-
frey H. Birnbaum, A Tame End to Patriot Act Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 
2006, at A15, Congress reauthorized a watered down version of the Patriot 
Act. See Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 2. For criticism, see, for example, David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 953, 966–74 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? 
The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Re-
pression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1111–28 (2002). 
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sive policies directed at Arabs and Muslims that, on several oc-
casions, a conservative Supreme Court rejected outright.3 
With few legal constraints and considerable deference from 
the courts, immigration law and policy quickly emerged as 
ground zero in the so-called war on terror declared by the Bush 
administration not long after September 11.4 By many ac-
counts, the measures unnecessarily sacrificed the civil rights of 
noncitizens—and, in certain instances, citizens.5 Each year, de-
portations rose to record levels as the U.S. government annu-
ally removed from the country hundreds of thousands of non-
citizens—almost all of whom had nothing whatsoever to do 
with terrorism.6 The policies forever changed the lives of thou-
sands of people and their families and friends. 
Today it may seem hard to believe, but shortly before Sep-
tember 11, 2001, after much lobbying by immigrant rights ad-
vocates, the U.S. Congress had been seriously considering pos-
sible liberalization of the immigration laws. “The events of 
[that day] brought immigration reform to an abrupt halt. In-
stead of legalization of undocumented workers and reconsidera-
tion of the restrictive nature of the 1996 immigration laws, 
Congress responded six weeks [after the attacks] with the pas-
sage of the USA Patriot Act.”7 September 11 effectively initiated 
 
 3. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786 (2006) (holding 
that military tribunals created by the Bush administration violated the law); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (ruling that a U.S. citizen held 
as an “enemy combatant” had the right to a hearing to challenge that classifi-
cation); see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004) (finding that the 
court in which the action was filed lacked jurisdiction over the defendant to 
entertain a challenge to the detention of a U.S. citizen classified as an “enemy 
combatant”); infra text accompanying notes 40–86 (outlining policies adopted 
by the Bush administration in the war on terror). The various anti-terror 
measures represented a “‘new . . . paradigm of prevention,’” that affirmatively 
seeks to stop terrorism before it is perpetrated. Jules Lobel, The Preventative 
Paradigm, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (2007) (quoting John Ashcroft, U.S. 
Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks Before the Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 
10, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/021003 
agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm). 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. See Michael Chertoff Holds a Briefing on the Secure Border Initiative, 
FDCH CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS (Aug. 23, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 
14608339 (estimating that the U.S. government would remove a record num-
ber of noncitizens from the country in 2006). 
 7. Barbara Hines, An Overview of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy 
Since 9/11, 12 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 9, 12 (2006). 
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a lengthy hiatus in the discussion of positive immigration re-
form as the general public sought to seal the borders.8 
Not until several years after September 11 did the United 
States again seriously consider much more mundane, and long-
standing, issues of immigration reform, particularly the issue 
of undocumented immigration from Mexico. Those new reform 
discussions, however, were the mirror image of the ones taking 
place before September 11. Attention centered not on liberaliz-
ing immigration laws but on taking steps in an effort to tighten 
the border, remove undocumented immigrants from the coun-
try, and generally restrict access to foreign nationals to the 
United States. 
In March 2006, the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that 
between 11.5 and 12 million undocumented immigrants lived in 
the United States,9 more than half of whom of Mexican origin.10 
This represented more than double the approximately five mil-
lion undocumented immigrants in the country when the U.S. 
government began in the early 1990s to greatly ramp up border 
enforcement through a series of military-style operations.11 
This fact bears repeating: A dramatic increase in the undocu-
mented immigrant population followed the largest enforcement 
build-up of the U.S./Mexico border in history.12 Put simply, if 
one measures the effectiveness of border enforcement by the 
 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S., at i (2006). 
 10. Id. at ii (noting that Mexicans represented over half of the undocu-
mented immigrant population in 2005). 
 11. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IM-
MIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE 200 tbl.N (1999). For a sampling of 
literature analyzing the deadly impacts of the U.S. government’s increased 
border enforcement measures, see generally TIMOTHY J. DUNN, THE MILITARI-
ZATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER, 1978–1992: LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT 
DOCTRINE COMES HOME (1996); KARL ESCHBACH ET AL., CAUSES AND TRENDS 
IN MIGRANT DEATHS ALONG THE U.S./MEXICO BORDER, 1985–1998 (2001); JO-
SEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER (2002); Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at 
the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control 
Policy, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661 (2001); Karl Eschbach et al., Death at 
the Border, 33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 430 (1999); Bill Ong Hing, The Dark 
Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 121 (2001); Gui-
llermo Alonso Meneses, Human Rights and Undocumented Migration Along 
the Mexican-U.S. Border, 51 UCLA L. REV. 267 (2003); Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. 
Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International 
Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1 (2001). 
 12. See BELINDA I. REYES ET AL., PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CAL. 
HOLDING THE LINE? THE EFFECT OF THE RECENT BORDER BUILD-UP ON UN-
AUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION, at viii, xii (2002). 
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size of the undocumented population in the United States, 
enhanced border enforcement has failed.13 
Many observers agree that the current immigration system 
is seriously broken and needs to be fixed.14 The problems and 
remedies identified by the principals to the national debate, 
however, diverge dramatically in kind and purpose. Restriction-
ists alarmed by undocumented immigration unabashedly play 
on fears of terrorism in insisting upon greater border enforce-
ment and punitive treatment of undocumented immigrants.15 
Those advocating on behalf of immigrants demand fairer 
treatment of immigrants including, for example, the regulari-
zation of the immigration status of undocumented immigrants; 
put differently, they advocate a new amnesty program, such as 
the one Congress passed in 1986.16 
Unfortunately, the national security fears that have 
gripped the United States since September 11 have tended to 
drive the most popular reform proposals toward extreme en-
forcement-oriented policies.17 Proposals floated in the 109th 
Congress included border fences, making the mere status of be-
ing undocumented a felony, and other harsh measures.18 
Groups like the Minuteman Project,19 a relatively small move-
 
 13. Absent the new border operations, the undocumented immigrant 
population might have grown even more. Nonetheless, at best, the aggressive 
measures only somewhat dampened the growth in the size of the population 
and, because these measures resulted in thousands of deaths, are morally and 
otherwise difficult to justify. See Cornelius, supra note 11, at 669. 
 14. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, 
AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 204–15 (2006); Hines, supra note 7, at 28. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394–404 (adding the Immigration & Nationality Act 
§ 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (2000)); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRA-
TION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 607–10 (4th ed. 2005) (describing the 
amnesty program). 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See Nicole Gaouette, Senate Toughens Border Stand, Approves Miles 
of New Fence, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at A1. In the end, after much acri-
mony and lengthy debate, Congress failed to enact any comprehensive immi-
gration reform proposal and agreed only to enact a law authorizing the exten-
sion of the fence along the United States’s southern border with Mexico. See 
Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 19. See Leo R. Chavez, Spectacle in the Desert: The Minuteman Project on 
the U.S.-Mexico Border, in GLOBAL VIGILANTES: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 
AND VIOLENCE (David Pratten & Atreyee Sen eds., forthcoming Sept. 2007); 
Peter Yoxall, Comment, The Minuteman Project, Gone in a Minute or Here to 
Stay? The Origin, History and Future of Citizen Activism on the United States-
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ment that received an extraordinary amount of press cover-
age,20 supported those and even tougher policies; at times, the 
Minutemen themselves patrolled the border in search of un-
documented immigrants.21 In contrast, in the spring of 2006, 
immigrant supporters took to the streets by the tens of thou-
sands in protest of the harsh enforcement-only approach em-
braced by a punitive bill passed by the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives.22 
This Article critically examines how national security con-
cerns have come to dominate—inappropriately in our view—the 
much-needed debate over comprehensive immigration reform.23 
Specifically, this Article contends that the security concerns 
that animated the conduct of the U.S. government after the 
horrible events of September 11, 2001, later distorted the de-
bate over reform of the immigration laws.24 When it comes to 
immigration reform, the myopic fixation with security and the 
so-called war on terror, has made it next to impossible for law- 
and policy-makers to see the forest through the trees.25 This is 
most unfortunate because meaningful reform of the U.S. immi-
gration laws is long overdue. 
If the U.S. government embraces more border enforcement 
without considering other policy goals, it would not be the first 
time that fear has triggered the adoption of tough immigration 
policies of dubious propriety. Economic insecurity inflamed by 
 
Mexico Border, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 517, 532 (2006) (describing the 
origins of the Minuteman Project). 
 20. See, e.g., Charlie LeDuff, Poised Against Incursions, A Man on the Bor-
der, Armed and Philosophical, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at A16 (profiling one 
of the Minutemen patrolling the southern U.S. border with Mexico). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Oscar Avila & Antonio Olivo, A Show of Strength: Thousands 
March to Loop for Immigrants’ Rights, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2006, at A1; Na-
thaniel Hoffman, Protest Supports Illegal Workers, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (San 
Francisco), Mar. 22, 2006, at A1; Mark Johnson & Linda Spice, Thousands 
March for Immigrants, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 24, 2006, at A1; Teresa 
Watanabe & Hector Becerra, 500,000 Cram Streets to Protest Immigration 
Bills, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at A1. 
 23. See HING, supra note 14, at 140–63; Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured 
Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming July 2007). 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. This is evidenced by the fact that both the House and Senate passed 
immigration reform bills—although much different ones—in the 109th Con-
gress. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 
109th Cong. (2006); Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration 
Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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racism contributed to the passage of the infamous laws exclud-
ing Chinese immigrants from the United States in the late 
nineteenth century.26 The Red Scare following World War I, 
combined with racial anxieties, led Congress to create a dis-
criminatory national origins quota system in 1924.27 In the 
1950s, the Cold War brought the nation politically motivated 
and ideologically driven detentions and deportations of nonciti-
zens even loosely suspected of Communist sympathies.28 In 
1996, in response to the bombing of the federal building in 
Oklahoma City perpetrated by U.S. citizens, which, strangely 
enough, fueled fears of foreign terrorism, Congress passed two 
punitive immigration reform laws29 that went well beyond hav-
ing anything to do with terrorism. These reforms punished im-
migrants convicted of ordinary criminal offenses through de-
tention and harsh new removal grounds combined with 
stringent limitations on judicial review of the executive 
branch’s immigration decisions. Characterized as “radical” by 
immigration moderates,30 many, if not most, informed observ-
 
 26. See ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE 
ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 177–78 (1971); RONALD TAKAKI, 
STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 110–11 (rev. ed. 1998); see also Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 
(1889) (upholding one of a series of laws excluding immigrants from China). 
 27. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
NATIVISM 1860–1925, at 222–33 (3d ed. 1994). 
 28. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, The Immigration Reform 
Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons 
for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833, 850–60 (1997); see, e.g., 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–16 (1953) (find-
ing the U.S. government could indefinitely detain a long-term lawful perma-
nent resident based on secret evidence—later found to be insufficient to justify 
exclusion—that he was a danger to national security); Galvan v. Press, 347 
U.S. 522, 529 (1952) (sanctioning the removal of a long-term lawful resident 
on account of membership in an organization the U.S. government classified 
as “Communist”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952) (up-
holding the deportation of three former Communist party members); United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (declining to 
disturb the U.S. government’s refusal to allow an alien to come to the United 
States to be with her U.S. citizen spouse based on secret evidence—later found 
to be insufficient to justify exclusion—that she was a danger to national secu-
rity). 
 29. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 30. PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 143 
(1998) (characterizing the 1996 reforms as “the most radical reform of immi-
gration law in decades—or perhaps ever”). 
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ers see these measures as unfair, ill-advised, and counterpro-
ductive.31 
Part I of this Article analyzes the U.S. government’s scat-
ter-shot attempts in the years since September 11 at improving 
national security by tightening the immigration laws and in-
creasing border enforcement.32 Besides being overbroad, under-
inclusive, and, in many instances, grossly unfair, the measures 
appear to have done little to truly improve the security of the 
United States but have done much to alienate the very commu-
nities whose help is desperately needed to effectively protect 
national security in modern times.33 
Part I further discusses how both Canada and Mexico re-
sponded individually to September 11 and worked with the 
United States on various anti-terrorism measures. Although a 
certain amount of regional cooperation followed the tragic 
events of September 11, not nearly enough was done to truly 
improve the overall security of North America as a region.34 A 
safer North America will require future cooperation between 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
Part II of the Article demonstrates how the war on terror 
has distorted the recent national debate over immigration re-
form.35 Security concerns have made it nearly impossible to 
have a rational discussion of changes to immigration law and 
policy necessary to fulfill important economic, political, and so-
cial goals of the United States. In no small part due to the 
“close the border” mentality September 11 fostered, border en-
forcement has increasingly been the only item of consensus in 
Congress when it comes to immigration reform.36 However, a 
focus on border enforcement, to the exclusion of other impor-
 
 31. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punish-
ment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1890, 1934 (2000) (“[The 1996 immigration laws] have caused immense 
hardship and suffering to thousands of people and have sought to eliminate 
the judicial branch entirely from any meaningful role in decisions of the most 
fundamental kind.”); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immi-
gration Reform and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 616 (2003) 
(labeling the 1996 immigration laws as “harsh”); Nancy Morawetz, Under-
standing the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of 
Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1962 (2000) (criticizing the scope 
and implications of the 1996 reforms). 
 32. See infra Part I.A. 
 33. See infra Part I.A. 
 34. See infra Part I.B. 
 35. See infra Part II. 
 36. See infra Part II.A. 
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tant policy goals, is short sighted.37 The United States requires 
more realistic laws that better comport with the economic, po-
litical and social realities of modern immigration.38 A truly 
comprehensive approach to immigration reform, more far-
reaching than any contemplated by the U.S. Congress in recent 
memory, is needed to bring the nation’s immigration laws in 
line with its various needs in the twenty-first century. 
This Article contends that immigration reform in the 
United States, coupled with multilateral efforts to address mi-
gration and national security concerns, are necessary to begin 
the overhaul of the immigration laws and their enforcement. 
Specifically, the United States, Canada, and Mexico—the par-
ties to the North American Free Trade Agreement—must work 
together on issues of migration and regional security. In the 
end, a more integrated North America, with freer movement of 
labor than what currently exists, likely would be a safer conti-
nent than it is today. Unfortunately, by alienating other na-
tions with the harsh treatment of their citizens, U.S. immigra-
tion policies in the war on terror may undermine those 
multilateral efforts.39 
I.  IMMIGRATION MEASURES IN THE WAR ON TERROR   
The horrible events of September 11 transformed the 
United States in many ways. Immigration law almost immedi-
ately became ground zero in the war on terror, and immigrants 
suffered the consequences.40 “Overreaction” is one way to de-
scribe the U.S. government’s swift and immediate response to 
the tragic loss of life. In a nutshell, the initial result was the 
punitive treatment of Arab and Muslim noncitizens, followed 
by the imposition of restrictive policies affecting all immi-
grants.41 
 
 37. See infra Part II.B. 
 38. For a far-reaching argument for more open borders, see KEVIN R. 
JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS 
BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAW (forthcoming Oct. 2007); see also HING, supra 
note 14, at 7 (advocating a more moral immigration policy for the United 
States). 
 39. See infra Part I.B. 
 40. See Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Le-
gitimizing the War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 60 (2004); Teresa 
Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After 
September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 86–95 (2005). 
 41. See infra Part I.A. 
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A. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11 
After September 11, 2001, the U.S. government took a va-
riety of immigration-related measures in the name of national 
security.42 In part, the U.S. government directed security 
measures at noncitizens because noncitizens were involved in 
the terrorist acts of September 11.43 Government actors, how-
ever, no doubt felt encouraged—or at least not deterred from—
taking aggressive measures against noncitizens because well-
settled precedent affords “plenary power” to the political 
branches of government in immigration matters, particularly 
those that touch on foreign relations and national security.44 
Deference to the political branches of government on na-
tional security matters has a lengthy historical pedigree: 
As far back as the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, and then in the 
 
 42. For analysis and criticism of these measures, see, for example, Susan 
M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURVEY AM. L. 295, 327–55 (2002) (documenting civil rights consequences); 
Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Conse-
quences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1192–
99 (2002) (describing U.S. government selective enforcement and racial subor-
dination); Cole, supra note 2, at 959–77; Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: 
Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and 
After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 32–46 (2002); Victor C. 
Romero, Decoupling “Terrorist” from “Immigrant”: An Enhanced Role for the 
Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 201, 202–06 (2003); 
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576–86 
(2002). Many reports have documented the civil and human rights abuses oc-
curring during the war on terror. See, e.g., MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI ET AL., MI-
GRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, AMERICA’S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, 
CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 12–14 (2003); 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, 
ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN 
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK (2003); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DE-
TAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION 
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 
ATTACKS (2003). 
 43. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ACTS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 145–253 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] 
(outlining the background behind, as well as the various persons involved in, 
the September 11 plot). 
 44. See, e.g., INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988) (“[Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS)] officials must exercise especially sensitive politi-
cal functions that implicate questions of foreign relations, and therefore the 
reasons for giving agency decisions . . . apply with even greater force in the 
INS context.” (footnote omitted)); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) 
(contending that deference to the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment on immigration matters was justified in part because “decisions in 
these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers”). 
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early federal immigration statutes of the late 1800s, immigration law 
has barred and deported noncitizens from the United States on ideo-
logical and national security grounds. Noncitizens can be arrested, 
detained, and deported under immigration law with little recourse to 
the constitutional protections that would limit the government out-
side of immigration.45 
In the days after September 11, 2001, when the public un-
equivocally demanded that government act decisively, immi-
grants could easily be targeted because the law made immigra-
tion measures the path of least resistance.46 
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, national 
security issues sporadically dominated the interpretation and 
enforcement of U.S. immigration laws. At times, the Supreme 
Court has been willing to invoke national security to justify ra-
cial exclusions in the immigration laws that in reality have 
only a most attenuated relationship with public safety. For ex-
ample, in The Chinese Exclusion Case, which upheld a law ex-
cluding most Chinese immigrants from U.S. shores, the Court 
in 1889 emphasized: 
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign ag-
gression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to 
attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordi-
nated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment 
come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character 
or from the vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The gov-
ernment, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protec-
tion and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion 
on which the powers shall be called forth . . . . If, therefore, the gov-
ernment of the United States, through its legislative department, con-
siders the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who 
will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security 
. . . . its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.47 
As the rationale upholding racial exclusions in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case suggests, the political branches of government 
in certain instances may excessively rely on the talisman of na-
tional security to justify invidious discrimination in immigra-
tion measures. However, as one member of Congress empha-
sized in analyzing immigration reform over the last ten years, 
including the 1996 immigration reforms, “[i]nstead of enacting 
rational immigration reform that will indeed strengthen our na-
tional security, Congress has enacted immigration changes that 
 
 45. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 174 (2006). 
 46. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
 47. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 
U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (emphasis added). 
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have very little or nothing to do with national security. [Repub-
lican] revolutionaries ‘revolutionized,’ the American tradition of 
immigration but, unfortunately, did not bring revolutionary 
change to protecting America from terrorists.”48 
The post-September 11 era is not the first time that the 
United States targeted specific groups of noncitizens in times of 
social stress emanating from tensions with the Arab and Mus-
lim world. When a group of U.S. citizens was held hostage in 
Iran a little more than twenty-five years ago, the U.S. govern-
ment deployed immigration law in numerous ways against Ira-
nian nationals. One regulation required only Iranian students 
on nonimmigrant visas to report to the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service and provide information about their resi-
dence and evidence of school enrollment.49 The court of appeals 
in Narenji v. Civiletti upheld the nationality-based regulation 
because it was founded on a “rational basis”; in so doing, the 
court emphasized that “it is not the business of courts to pass 
judgment on the decisions of the President in the field of for-
eign policy.”50 Courts reviewing other federal regulations di-
rected at Iranian citizens during this time period similarly re-
fused to interfere with the President’s judgment.51 
Narenji v. Civiletti provides legal support for the U.S. gov-
ernment’s use of immigration policies in the war on terror. 
However, the judicial deference to the federal government’s ac-
tions directed at Iranians in the United States during the hos-
tage crisis was criticized in ways that readily apply to the 
government’s response to the events of September 11: 
Narenji is troublesome because an executive classification based on 
 
 48. Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An In-
side Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 378 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 49. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 746–49 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (describing the regulation at issue). 
 50. Id. at 748; see also supra text accompanying notes 42–48. 
 51. See, e.g., Ghaelian v. INS, 717 F.2d 950, 953 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that the court lacked jurisdiction to review an Equal Protection challenge to a 
regulation in a deportation action); Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 815 (10th 
Cir. 1982) (upholding a regulation allowing Iranian citizens only fifteen days 
before voluntarily departing the country); Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880, 
881 (3d Cir. 1981) (reaching the same conclusion as the court in Ghaelian); 
Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981) (reaching the same 
conclusion as the court in Nademi). However, when national security concerns 
were not at their zenith, the courts intervened to halt discrimination against 
Vietnamese immigrants in refugee processing. See Legal Assistance for Viet-
namese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 
vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 1 (1996). 
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nationality in a foreign affairs crisis poses the danger that the Execu-
tive will overvalue the government interest and undervalue the indi-
vidual constitutional interest. In a severe crisis, the political and psy-
chological pressures on the Executive are extreme. In this situation, 
executive measures may be motivated by frustration or desperation 
rather than by an assessment of their actual usefulness, or they may 
reflect little more than a desire to appear stern and decisive. Con-
versely, in times of crisis the individual interests of persons selected 
for special burdens may be grossly undervalued. Indeed, the virulence 
of popular feeling against Iranian nationals during the hostage crisis 
raises the possibility that the Executive, in imposing special burdens 
on Iranian students, may have been reflecting to some extent a con-
stitutionally impermissible hostility based on national origin. The 
atmosphere during the hostage crisis was marked by a hostility di-
rected at citizens of Iran that resembled to some extent the hostility 
that is frequently directed toward citizens of an enemy nation during 
a war.52 
After September 11, the panoply of U.S. government poli-
cies directed at immigrants in many respects overvalued secu-
rity, undervalued the rights of immigrants and appears to have 
done little to make the nation much safer. Panic, fear, and an-
ger seized the day.53 The U.S. government felt strong pressures 
to act swiftly and decisively in a tough fashion. The measures 
unfortunately also reflected generalized suspicion of and hostil-
ity toward Arabs and Muslims, with few willing to defend the 
rights of these immigrant communities. Such hostility no doubt 
contributed to violence by private citizens against Arabs and 
Muslims.54 In the end, Arab and Muslim citizens as well as 
 
 52. Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. 
REV. 785, 856 (1984) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also PETER AN-
DREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE, at vii–xii (2000) 
(concluding that the U.S. government has pursued increased border enforce-
ment for political and symbolic impacts despite its overall lack of effective-
ness). Importantly, the policies challenged in cases like Narenji v. Civiletti 
were limited to nationals of one nation, see Akram & Johnson, supra note 42, 
at 338, not the broader, more diffuse—and often religious-based—range of na-
tionalities implicated in the Bush administration’s war on terror. 
 53. See Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 = 3/11 = 7/7 + ? What Counts in Coun-
terterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 559–60 (2006) (analyzing psy-
chological pressures on society to overreact in times of social stress); Adrian 
Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, 36 RUT. L.J. 871, 871–72 (2005) (studying how 
law often cannot restrain the excesses of society caught in a panic over recent 
catastrophic events). 
 54. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Ra-
cial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1265–77 (2004); Bill 
Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 442–44 (2002). 
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noncitizens suffered.55 Not much later, many different immi-
grant communities felt the sting of the war on terror.56 
1. Stage 1: Arabs and Muslims 
Among other steps in the name of national security, the 
U.S. government required special registration of certain Arab 
and Muslim noncitizens, arrested, detained, and interrogated 
large numbers of Arab and Muslim noncitizens, and engaged in 
selective deportations of Arab and Muslim noncitizens.57 The 
executive branch justified the imposition of special registration 
requirements on Arab and Muslim noncitizens on the ground 
that the political branches of the federal government had “ple-
nary power” over immigration, with little, if any, room for judi-
cial oversight. In promulgating the regulations, then-Attorney 
General John Ashcroft emphasized that “[t]he political 
branches of the government have plenary authority in the im-
migration area. . . . In the context of immigration and national-
ity laws, the Supreme Court has particularly ‘underscore[d] the 
limited scope of judicial inquiry.’”58 Other measures directed at 
noncitizens no doubt were founded on the plenary power ra-
tionale and the notion that the courts would—and should—be 
inclined to defer to the executive branch on matters touching on 
national security.59 
Unfortunately, throughout U.S. history, harsh measures 
with the stated aim of bolstering national security often have 
 
 55. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 56. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 57. See infra Parts I.A.1–2. 
 58. Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 
52584, 52585 (Aug. 12, 2002) (citations omitted). This position is consistent 
with other claims by the Bush administration that ordinary legal principles do 
not restrict the conduct of the executive branch in the fight against terrorism. 
See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2086 
(2005) (“The Article shows that [the establishment of a space in which de-
tainee abuses could occur] was the self-conscious creation of the Executive, 
which asserted that the country was at war, and that in wartime, courts must 
bow to a boundless and unreviewable presidential prerogative.”); Diane Marie 
Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 265–66 (2004); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the War 
on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2006). Even if the plenary power 
doctrine did not preclude judicial review, there might be a debate over 
whether the U.S. Constitution applied to the various measures taken by the 
U.S. government in the war on terror. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1029–32 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 605–10 (2003). 
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 42–56. 
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been directed at unpopular racial minorities.60 The internment 
of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II is perhaps 
the most well-known example.61 Building on previous security-
oriented measures, the U.S. government’s response to the 
events of September 11, 2001, proved to be no different, focus-
ing on a discrete and insular minority that lacked meaningful 
power in the political process.62 
The months after September 11 saw the U.S. government 
adopt a flurry of extraordinary policies directed primarily at 
Arab and Muslim noncitizens.63 Interrogations, arrests, deten-
tion, special registration, and selective deportations of Arab 
and Muslim noncitizens emerged as a part of national security 
policy.64 Secret immigration hearings behind closed doors be-
came the norm in cases involving alleged terrorists.65 Long af-
 
 60. See Gil Gott, The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National 
Security Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1073, 1073–77 (2005). 
 61. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding 
an order excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from parts of the West 
Coast); see also Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century 
“Alien Land Laws” as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 37–38, 
(1998) (contending that alien land laws in various states before World War II 
served as a precursor to internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during 
World War II). See generally Symposium, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Re-
membered: Examining the Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on Their 
Sixtieth Anniversary, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2005) (utilizing “what 
might be termed a multi-modal approach to remembering Korematsu . . . and 
other cases from World War II in which Japanese Americans used the courts 
to contest their eviction and confinement”); Symposium, The Long Shadow of 
Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1998) (offering a variety of perspectives on the 
legacy of the internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War 
II); supra text accompanying note 47 (referring to the national security ration-
ale offered by the Supreme Court in the decision upholding the Chinese exclu-
sion law). 
 62. See Joo, supra note 42, at 32–46 (drawing parallels between the Bush 
administration’s war on terror and the internment of the Japanese during 
World War II). 
 63. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1201–17 (2004) (describing antiterrorism policies 
and methods enacted after September 11, 2001). 
 64. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of 
Homeland Security, 6 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 195, 202–07 (2006). 
 65. Courts have reached conflicting decisions about the constitutionality 
of the blanket closure of deportation proceedings in “special interest” (i.e., ter-
rorist) cases. Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that a policy denying press access to hearings violated the 
First Amendment), with North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 
198, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding the policy constitutional). For criticism of 
the secret procedures, see Lauren Gilbert, When Democracy Dies Behind 
Closed Doors: The First Amendment and “Special Interest” Hearings, 55 RUT-
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ter September 11, preventative detention of thousands of Arabs 
and Muslims remained a part of the war on terror.66 Arrests, 
detentions, and interrogations, without access to counsel or the 
handing down of criminal indictments, became commonplace.67 
But there is much more. In Operation Absconder, the U.S. 
government focused removal efforts selectively on noncitizens 
from nations that “harbored” terrorists, identified for the most 
part as nations populated predominantly by Arabs and Mus-
lims.68 Although criticized as impermissible racial profiling, the 
targeting of Arabs and Muslims in various immigration policies 
flourished for several years after September 11, 2001.69 
Consider one prominent example of an extraordinary policy 
adopted by the Bush administration in the name of counter-
terrorism. As part of the National Security Entry/Exit Regis-
tration System, generally known as “special registration,” the 
Department of Homeland Security required male noncitizens 
 
GERS L. REV. 741, 743–55 (2003); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration 
Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative 
State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 95–101 (2004); Gregory P. Magarian, 
Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional Protection for Nonpoliti-
cal Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 264–67 (2005). 
 66. See David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s 
Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1753 (2004) (“As of January 2004, the gov-
ernment had detained more than 5000 foreign nationals through its antiter-
rorism efforts.” (citation omitted)); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and 
Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767, 778–85 (2002). 
 67. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 42, at 327–55. For criticism of the 
Bush administration’s violation of the law through these and other measures, 
see Raquel Aldana, The September 11 Immigration Detentions and Unconstitu-
tional Executive Legislation, 29 S. ILL. L.J. 5, 5–11 (2004). 
 68. See Kevin Lapp, Pressing Public Necessity: The Unconstitutionality of 
the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 573, 
573–76 (2005); Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Pol-
icy Is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1190–93 (2004). 
 69. See Banks, supra note 63, at 1212–15; Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, 
Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin and Race, 6 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 9, 13–16 (2003); Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 45, 46–53 (2003); Thomas M. McDonnell, Targeting the Foreign Born by 
Race and Nationality: Counterproductive in the “War on Terrorism”?, 16 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 19, 21–23 (2004); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Profiling, Terrorism, 
and Time, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1181, 1183–85 (2005); see also Samuel R. 
Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1413, 1413–15 (2002) (discussing controversy over racial profiling following 
security measures put into place by the U.S. government after September 11, 
2001); Stephen H. Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Nonciti-
zens: National Security and International Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 161, 163–72 (2005) (criticizing profiling in many of the Bush ad-
ministration’s policies in the war on terror). 
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over age sixteen from twenty-five predominantly Muslim na-
tions to register for fingerprinting, photographing, and inter-
views.70 Nearly thirteen thousand registrants—upon voluntar-
ily reporting—were placed in removal proceedings and 
hundreds were detained.71 Angry protests followed the arrests 
and detentions.72 As with other anti-terrorism measures 
adopted by the U.S. government, critics claimed that the spe-
cial registration program constituted impermissible racial, na-
tional origin, and religious profiling.73 However, a lawsuit chal-
lenging special registration failed, with the court relying 
heavily on the precedent of Narenji v. Civiletti.74 To add insult 
to injury, the U.S. government never claimed that special regis-
tration uncovered any terrorists. Given that the Bush adminis-
tration discontinued the program, it seems unlikely that special 
registration uncovered any significant leads in the war on ter-
ror. 
The post-September 11 security measures were built on a 
foundation of previous security measures directed at suspected 
Arab and Muslim “terrorists.”75 For example, the definition of 
“terrorist activity”76 has long been a part of the U.S. immigra-
 
 70. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.1(f ), 264.1(f ) (2006). 
 71. See Hing, supra note 64, at 203. 
 72. See Emily Bazar, New Battle on Civil Rights Front, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
Jan. 20, 2003, at A1; Wyatt Buchanan, Hundreds Protest INS Registration, 
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11, 2003, at A13. 
 73. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and We the People After Septem-
ber 11, 66 ALB. L. REV. 413, 420–21 (2003); Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to 
Internment: Special Registration and Other Human Rights Violations of Arabs 
and Muslims, 29 VT. L. REV. 407, 411–19 (2005); Heidee Stoller et al., Note, 
Developments in Law and Policy: The Costs of Post-9/11 National Security 
Strategy, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 220–22 (2004); see also Kathryn Loh-
meyer, Comment, The Pitfalls of Plenary Power: A Call for Meaningful Review 
of NSEERS “Special Registration,” 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 139, 139–41 (2003) 
(advocating judicial review of a special registration program). 
 74. See Roundahal v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892 (N.D. Ohio 2003); 
see also Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69–74 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting 
the argument that evidence obtained through registration should be sup-
pressed based on Constitutional violations); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 
681–82 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding, in a removal case, that special registration did 
not violate the Equal Protection guarantee); supra text accompanying notes 
49–52 (discussing Narenji v. Civiletti). 
 75. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 42, at 301–26. 
 76. The Immigration & Nationality Act, § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B), provides a lengthy definition of terrorist activities, which in-
cludes providing material support to a “terrorist organization” as designated 
by the U.S. government. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2000). For criticism of the 
material support provisions, as amended, see David Cole, The New McCarthy-
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tion laws and has been criticized as excessively overbroad.77 
The USA Patriot Act further expanded the definition.78 The 
terrorism provisions come up most frequently as the basis for 
denying relief from deportation to noncitizens, such as asylum 
for those who claim to fear persecution if returned to their na-
tive land.79 In addition, the U.S. government for a number of 
years before 2001 conducted so-called secret evidence hearings 
in cases in which the government sought to deport Arabs and 
Muslims based on evidence never revealed to the noncitizens.80 
Such policies can only deepen the divide between the Muslim 
world and the United States and discourage much-needed co-
operation with the U.S. government. 
Besides immigration-related measures, the U.S. govern-
ment has made some highly publicized criminal arrests in the 
name of fighting terrorism, almost all of which, despite the ini-
tial sensational headlines, have turned out to be of little conse-
quence. Perhaps the most well-known example is the case of 
Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen by birth who converted to Islam. 
The U.S. government held Padilla, originally accused by Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft of involvement in a plot to detonate 
a “dirty bomb” on U.S. soil,81 as an enemy combatant for more 
than three years, only to later charge him with relatively minor 
criminal offenses. 
 
ism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
8–15 (2003). 
 77. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that 
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1131 (1994); Gerald L. Neuman, Ter-
rorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 322–27 (2000); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal 
Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2871–74 (1999). 
 78. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Stat. 272 (2001); Cole, supra note 
2, at 966–70; Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Col-
lateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 855–57 (2003). 
 79. See, e.g., McAllister v. Attorney Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 186–87 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 667 (2006); Kelava v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 625, 629–30 
(9th Cir. 2005) amended and superseded by 434 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 296–301 (3d Cir. 2004); Cheema v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 854–59 (9th Cir. 2004); Perinpanathan v. INS, 310 
F.3d 594, 598–99 (8th Cir. 2002); In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 946 (BIA 
2006). 
 80. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 42, at 321–26. 
 81. See James Risen & Philip Shenon, U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to 
Use Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A1 (reporting Padilla’s 
arrest). 
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Put simply, the U.S. government initially targeted Arabs 
and Muslims in the war on terror. However, it did not end 
there. 
2. Stage 2: All Other Immigrants 
The impacts of the U.S. government’s September 11 secu-
rity measures spread well beyond Arab and Muslim nonciti-
zens. Instead, the new measures had a general impact on im-
migrant communities across the United States. Record 
numbers of deportations, aggressive enforcement of the immi-
gration laws, citizenship requirements for certain jobs, and a 
general immigration crackdown affected immigrants, with the 
largest cohort of immigrants being from Mexico.82 Immigration 
raids, citizenship requirements, and removal campaigns af-
fected many more ordinary Mexican immigrants than sus-
pected terrorists. 
This is part of a more general problem. Today, unlike the 
days of old, the U.S. immigration laws for the most part are fa-
cially neutral and do not expressly discriminate on the basis of 
race. However, the enforcement of immigration law often has 
disparate impacts.83 For example, annual ceilings on immi-
grant admissions from a single country in any year apply to all 
nations but have a disproportionate impact on prospective im-
migrants from Mexico and other developing nations such as 
China, India, and the Philippines, because demand for immi-
gration from there for reasons of, among others, proximity, 
jobs, and family ties, greatly exceeds the annual ceiling of 
25,600.84 
 
 82. See Johnson, supra note 78, at 858–63 (discussing the disproportion-
ate impacts of new immigration laws on Mexican immigrants); see also Steven 
W. Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and Its Con-
sequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. REV. 1153, 1161–65 (2002) (documenting 
how war on terror measures have adversely affected Latinas/os in the United 
States). 
 83. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic 
Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 
1131–36 (1998). 
 84. See Bernard Trujillo, Immigrant Visa Distribution: The Case of Mex-
ico, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 713, 715 (2000); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immi-
gration, Equality and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 319, 326–30 
(1993) (commenting on the racial impacts of per-country ceilings); Jan C. Ting, 
“Other Than a Chinaman”: How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted from and 
Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 301, 308 (1995) (same). 
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Similarly, increased border enforcement on the southern 
border with Mexico obviously has had, and will continue to 
have, a disproportionate impact on Mexican citizens. Among 
other effects, enhanced border enforcement tends to exacerbate 
the problem of human trafficking of migrants—an industry 
that has grown substantially over the last decade—from Mex-
ico.85 
Most of the immigration reform proposals that Congress 
considered in 2005–06 would have disproportionately affected 
certain groups of immigrants. A majority of undocumented im-
migrants living in the United States are from Mexico.86 Mexi-
can immigrants—as well as many citizen family members—
thus have a vital interest at stake in the enactment of propos-
als, for example, to regularize their immigration status. In-
creased border enforcement also would disparately impact un-
documented Mexican migrants, especially because most of the 
proposals for heightened enforcement focus almost exclusively 
on the U.S./Mexico border. 
B. NORTH AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11 
The national security responses to September 11 were not 
limited to those of the U.S. government. That fateful day prod-
ded the governments of many nations to take counter-terrorism 
measures.87 Specifically, the governments of all the nations of 
North America individually responded to the terrorist acts of 
September 11. Canada, Mexico, and the United States also 
worked together in small ways to improve regional security. 
Much more, however, remains to be done. 
 
 85. See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding 
the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2977 (2006) (analyzing the modern problem of trafficking in human beings). 
Human trafficking is a problem for citizens of other nations as well. See Con-
ference Report, Transatlantic Workshop on Human Smuggling, 15 GEO. IM-
MIGR. L.J. 167 (2001) (outlining instances of human trafficking in various 
countries). 
 86. See PASSEL, supra note 9, at i (estimating that about fifty-six percent 
of undocumented immigrants are Mexican nationals). 
 87. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Other People’s PATRIOT Acts: Europe’s Re-
sponse to September 11, 50 LOY. L. REV. 89 (2004) (providing an overview of 
post-September 11 legislation in some European countries and pan-European 
organizations); see also Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights for Security? The 
Choice Between Smart, Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada 
and Britain, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2151 (2006) (analyzing the trade-off between 
national security and civil rights in security measures taken by Canada and 
Britain). 
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1. National Responses 
Not long after September 11, Canada passed its own immi-
gration legislation designed to improve national security.88 In 
December 2001, Canada enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act, which 
expanded the government’s surveillance and other powers in 
fighting terrorism.89 Although less extreme than the USA Pa-
triot Act, Canada evidently felt—with the encouragement, no 
doubt, of the U.S. government—that it must do something to 
protect itself from terrorist acts as well as to aid America’s war 
on terror.90 
Mexico also agreed to take steps consistent with the U.S. 
government’s counter-terrorism measures.91 Mexico, at the be-
hest of the U.S. government, has continued to restrict immigra-
tion through its territory so that fewer migrants from Central 
America will attempt to make the journey to the United 
States.92 In addition, the leaders of the United States and Mex-
ico frequently discuss cooperation on immigration and security 
issues.93 
 
 88. See ABA Immigration and Nationality Comm., The Canada-U.S. Bor-
der: Balancing Trade, Security and Migrant Rights in the Post 9/11 Era, 19 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 199, 218–24 (2004) (describing legislation passed in Canada 
in response to September 11); Kent Roach, Did September 11 Change Every-
thing? Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in the Face of Terrorism, 47 
MCGILL L.J. 893, 895 (2002) (discussing the Canadian response to September 
11); Reg Whitaker, Keeping Up with the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 
9/11 in Historical and Comparative Context, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 241, 259–
60 (2003) (highlighting the historical foundations and uniquely Canadian na-
ture of Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act). 
 89. Anti-Terrrorism Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 41 (Can.); see David Jenkins, In 
Support of Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act: A Comparison of Canadian, British, 
and American Anti-Terrorism Law, 66 SASK. L. REV. 419, 422 (2003). 
 90. See Michel Coutu & Marie-Helene Giroux, The Aftermath of 11 Sep-
tember 2001: Liberty vs. Security Before the Supreme Court of Canada, 18 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 313, 314 (2006). 
 91. See infra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 92. See Joseph Contreras, Stepping over the Line: Don’t Try Sneaking 
North Across Mexico’s Other Border, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2006, at 38 (calling 
attention to Mexico’s treatment of undocumented workers); Ginger Thompson, 
Mexico Worries About Its Own Southern Border, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at 
A1 (describing ways in which the Mexican government deals with illegal im-
migration into Mexico). 
 93. See, e.g., Hale E. Sheppard, Salvaging Trade, Economic and Political 
Relations with Mexico in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks: A Call for a 
Reevaluation of U.S. Law and Policy, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 33, 63–64 (2002); Gin-
ger Thompson & David E. Sanger, Bush and Fox Repeat Vows on Immigration, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at A7. 
JOHNSON TRUJILLO_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:29:08 AM 
2007] IMMIGRATION REFORM 1389 
 
All told, the nations of North America adopted incremental 
internal immigration and related reforms ostensibly directed at 
terrorism. They also cooperated in adopting limited regional 
measures. 
2. Multilateral Responses 
Security is not just an issue for the United States but one 
facing all of North America. It also is a global issue. As the 
process of globalization continues, the world slowly integrates 
economically and politically. Domestic reform of the U.S. immi-
gration laws unquestionably is necessary. Moreover, interna-
tional cooperation on the related issues of migration and na-
tional security needs is essential. Multilateralism is necessary 
to help the North American nations to improve national and 
regional security. 
 A model for regional cooperation is readily available. 
With the emergence of a common market with a unitary cur-
rency, Europe through the emergence of the European Union 
(EU) is far ahead of North America in terms of the integration 
of the political and economic institutions of the various nations. 
International integration through the EU has dramatically 
changed immigration law and policy in Europe, with labor mo-
bility generally permitted between most of the member na-
tions.94 Such mobility has grown as the EU has expanded to in-
clude more member nations. 
In sharp contrast, the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
have accomplished only a partial integration of their economies 
through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).95 
The trade pact provided for the expanded free trade of goods 
and services in North America. However, the NAFTA parties 
failed to address immigration, labor mobility, and related re-
gional security issues. In the long run, the nations comprising 
North America must work together to address security con-
cerns.96 
 
 94. See Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and 
Mexican Immigration to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 971–73 
(1994); John A. Scanlan, A View from the United States—Social, Economic, 
and Legal Change, the Persistence of the State, and Immigration Policy in the 
Coming Century, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 125–32 (1994) (summariz-
ing the theoretical justifications and goals of the European Union’s labor mi-
gration policies). 
 95. U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 96. See infra text accompanying notes 97–124. 
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In formulating the North American trade pact, the United 
States steadfastly refused to discuss, much less address, labor 
migration in any meaningful way.97 Consequently, NAFTA left 
a critical economic issue off the bargaining table and, in the 
end, failed to provide a comprehensive, integrated regional ap-
proach to immigration. For the time being, the United States 
could improve security by working more closely with Canada 
and Mexico on common immigration and security concerns.98 At 
this point, however, Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
have only cooperated to a limited extent.99 However, more will 
be necessary in the future to ensure regional security. 
Importantly, the U.S./Canada border implicates the safety 
and security of the United States. While the U.S. border with 
Mexico has received the bulk of attention of U.S. policy-makers, 
the northern border of the United States indeed requires con-
sideration.100 As Doris Meissner, former Commissioner of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and influential stu-
dent of immigration policy, observed, 
I can predict there will be far more focus on Canada. Canada as a 
gateway for terrorists is very much on the agenda. I hope that we can 
be reasonable and recognize the folly of attempting to fortify our land 
border with Canada. More resources directed at the northern border 
are needed. But ultimately the security issue with Canada must be 
handled through international cooperation by joining forces to share 
intelligence, cross designate personnel, treat Canadian airport opera-
tions as equivalent to entering the U.S., and comparable meas-
ures. . . . It is a direction that envisions North American perimeter 
security through bilateral and international cooperation and integra-
 
 97. See Johnson, supra note 94, at 956–64 (describing the drafters’ rea-
sons for excluding labor migration considerations from NAFTA); Scanlan, su-
pra note 94, at 86–87 (highlighting the purposeful exclusion of integrated la-
bor market provisions from NAFTA); M. Jeanette Yakamavich, Comment, 
NAFTA on the Move: The United States and Mexico on a Journey Toward the 
Free Movement of Workers—A NAFTA Progress Report and EU Comparison, 8 
LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 463, 472–73 (2002) (hypothesizing reasons for excluding 
labor migration from NAFTA). 
 98. See John Noble, Fortress America or Fortress North America?, 11 LAW 
& BUS. REV. AM. 461, 475–76 (2005) (discussing the possibility of forming a 
North American Community with integrated security measures). 
 99. See, e.g., id. at 472–74. 
 100. See Russell C. Gray, Note, Run from the Border: The United States Re-
Evaluation of Its Northern Boundary, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 77, 89–
90 (2003); see also Daniel Schwanen, Deeper, Broader: A Roadmap for a Treaty 
with North America, 10 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 345, 355–56 (2004) (envisioning 
a “community of North Americans” in which security is one of the goals of in-
creased integration). 
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tion as the only sound platform upon which to build public safety and 
security for us and for our neighbors.101 
However, precious little effort has been devoted to the se-
curity of the Canadian border, with almost all security meas-
ures myopically directed to the U.S. border with Mexico.102 This 
is true despite the fact that, just a few years ago, at least one 
terrorist sought to enter the United States from the North.103 
To this point in time, there has been a limited amount of 
regional cooperation on migration and security issues in North 
America. But increased interest in binational border control 
programs between the United States and Canada and law en-
forcement initiatives since September 11 are evident.104 In De-
cember 2001, the United States and Canada entered into a 
“smart border” agreement designed to increase security while 
facilitating lawful cross-border movement of persons and goods 
between the two nations.105 Consistent with the NAFTA mis-
sion, this agreement included a number of security measures 
while also facilitating the mobility of goods, services, and peo-
ple. Canada and the United States also agreed to require mi-
grants to seek asylum in the first of the two countries that they 
enter.106 In August 2006, no doubt in response to pressure from 
the United States, Canada promised to take further steps to 
tighten border security.107 
The NAFTA nations today should recognize that North 
American integration is directly related to regional security.108 
 
 101. Doris Meissner, Immigration in the Post 9-11 Era, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 
851, 858 (2002). 
 102. See infra Part II (analyzing the current debate over immigration re-
form). 
 103. See infra text accompanying note 170 (mentioning the case of the Mil-
lennium Bomber, who attempted to enter the United States from Canada). 
 104. See ABA Immigration and Nationality Comm., supra note 88, at 232–
33. 
 105. See id. at 224–33 (describing some facets of the agreement’s thirty-
point action plan); Joseph L. Parks, Comment, The United States-Canada 
Smart Border Action Plan: Life in the FAST Lane, 10 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 
395 (2004). 
 106. See Audrey Macklin, Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Can-
ada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 365, 
371–72 (2005). 
 107. See Christopher Mason, Canada to Arm Its Border Guards, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at A8. U.S. lawmakers previously had complained of lax 
Canadian border security. See Stephen Handleman, Think Outside the Border, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2006, at A17. 
 108. See Jason Ackleson, Achieving “Security and Prosperity”: Migration 
and North American Economic Integration, IMMIGR. POL’Y IN FOCUS, Feb. 
JOHNSON TRUJILLO_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:29:08 AM 
1392 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1369 
 
In March 2005, the United States, Canada, and Mexico an-
nounced the establishment of a Security and Prosperity Part-
nership.109 Through multilateral cooperation the partnership 
seeks to improve the security of North America, strengthen in-
ternal security within each nation, and promote regional eco-
nomic growth.110 According to a recent report on its progress, 
discussions between the three partners have continued on a va-
riety of initiatives, with some incremental measures actually 
being implemented.111 Only time will tell whether the Security 
and Prosperity Partnership will lead to greater cooperation 
among the nations on matters of national security. 
Future multilateral cooperation in North America will 
need to focus on immigration and security issues.112 One impor-
tant move would be to allow greater internal migration within 
the United States, Mexico, and Canada akin to that which cur-
rently exists in the European Union.113 Freer labor migration 
would fit comfortably into the trade relationship that currently 
exists between the NAFTA member nations. One could envision 
a Fortress North America like the Fortress Europe that has 
emerged in the EU,114 with a concentrated focus on securing 
the perimeter of the member nations. Although that develop-
ment in the EU has been criticized in some quarters,115 freer 
 
2006, at 2; see also Rafael Fernández de Castro & Rossana Fuentes Berain, 
Hands Across North America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at A17 (suggesting 
that a partnership might move the United States, Canada, and Mexico toward 
greater regional integration akin to that existing in the European Union). 
 109. See Ackleson, supra note 108, at 5. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Industry Canada: Ministers Report to Leaders on Security and 
Prosperity Partnership Initiatives, CCNMATTHEWS, Sept. 7, 2006, http://www 
.cdn-news.com/news/releases/show.jsp?action=showRelease&searchText= 
false&showText=all&actionFor=611059. 
 112. See generally Daniel C. Stiles, Border Crisis: Time for a New Collective 
Review of Tri-Nation Border Security, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 299 (2002) (calling for 
the United States to cooperate with Canada and Mexico in order to balance 
the need for border security with the need to efficiently transport goods across 
our borders). For a study of the possibilities for multilateral cooperation in this 
area, see Symposium, North American Migration, Trade and Security, 11 LAW 
& BUS. REV. AM. 321 (2005). 
 113. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Legal Immigration Reform: Toward Ra-
tionality and Equity, in Blueprints for an Ideal Legal Immigration Policy 5–6 
(Richard D. Lamm & Alan Simpson eds., Ctr. for Immigr. Stud., Working Pa-
per No. 17, 2001). 
 114. See Noble, supra note 98, at 475–76. 
 115. See, e.g., Lydia Esteve González & Richard Mac Bride, Fortress 
Europe: Fear of Immigration? Present and Future of Immigration Law and 
Policy in Spain, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 153, 191–92 (2000); Bob Hep-
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migration within North America, with heightened border con-
trols at the perimeter of the continent, might be more politi-
cally acceptable than entirely open borders. 
3. U.S. Immigration Law and Policy Since September 11 Has 
Hindered Multilateral Cooperation on National Security 
Matters. 
Rather than facilitating multilateral cooperation to im-
prove global and regional security, U.S. immigration law and 
policy in the post-September 11 period has had detrimental im-
pacts on such cooperation. The harsh treatment of noncitizens 
has alienated Arab, Muslim, and other communities in the 
United States and has also estranged their home govern-
ments.116 Similarly, the harsh impacts of tighter immigration 
laws, as well as the terms of the immigration debate, have hin-
dered relations with other nations, especially Mexico.117 
Indeed, U.S immigration law and policy has caused serious 
rifts between Mexico and the United States.118 In 2005 and 
2006, the Mexican government reacted negatively to the harsh 
border enforcement bills pending in the U.S. Congress. Eleven 
Latin American countries, including Mexico, lobbied against 
the Sensenbrenner bill,119 a strict border enforcement measure 
the U.S. House of Representatives passed at the end of 2005 
that provoked mass marches throughout the United States.120 
The extension of the fence along the U.S./Mexico border author-
ized by Congress in 2006 drew loud protests from Mexican po-
litical leaders as well.121 
International tensions over migration are not limited to the 
United States and Mexico, however. Tighter border controls on 
the northern U.S. border after September 11 elicited protests 
from the Canadian government over the treatment of its citi-
 
ple, Race and Law in Fortress Europe, 67 MOD. L. REV. 1 passim (2004). 
 116. See supra Part I.A. 
 117. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 118. See The Border: A Festering Issue, MEXICO & NAFTA REP., Jan. 17, 
2006. 
 119. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 120. See Jerry Seper, Pro-Immigration Forces to March on Washington, 
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A3. 
 121. See Héctor Tobar, Mexicans See Good and Bad Side to Wall, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A27 (“[Mexican] President Vicente Fox and President-
elect Felipe Calderon have denounced the new [border] fence, as have a host of 
Mexican political leaders.”). 
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zens.122 More generally, the proposed elimination of a visa 
waiver program for citizens of certain nations, designed to im-
prove U.S. security, may have more general adverse foreign re-
lations repercussions. According to the U.S. General Account-
ing Office, “[t]he decision to eliminate the program could 
negatively affect U.S. relations with participating countries, 
could discourage some business and tourism in the United 
States, and would increase the need for State Department re-
sources.”123 
Multilateralism will be essential to fighting terrorism in 
the future,124 as well as ensuring peace in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Harsh treatment of immigrants since September 11, 2001, 
has caused international tensions and has hindered multilat-
eral efforts to improve national security. Consequently, improv-
ing foreign relations through immigration reform is a benefit 
well worth considering. 
C. THE END RESULT 
What is the end result of the security measures imple-
mented in North America after September 11? Noncitizens in 
the United States experienced removals and increased immi-
gration enforcement—and selective enforcement of the immi-
gration laws.125 There is no evidence that any actual terrorists 
have been deported, and few terrorists have been convicted. 
Zacarias Moussaoui, the best-known terrorist arrested in con-
nection with the acts of September 11, 2001, was in custody on 
September 11. He pled guilty to charges for his involvement for 
his role in the terrorist plot and was given a life sentence.126 
Even if terrorists have been removed from the United States, it 
is not intuitively obvious that the removals improved public 
 
 122. See Glenn Kessler, Powell Aims to Reassure Canadians, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 15, 2002, at A30; Tonda MacCharles, We’re Both at Risk, Powell Tells 
Canada, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 15, 2002, at A7; see also Jim Rankin, Canadian 
in Passport Fiasco, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 14, 2003, at A1 (reporting that the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service accused a Canadian citizen of using a 
forged Canadian passport and subjected her to expedited removal to India). 
 123. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BORDER SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS OF 
ELIMINATING THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 3–4 (2002). 
 124. See John W. Head, What Has Not Changed Since September 11—The 
Benefits of Multilateralism, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–5 (2002) (discuss-
ing the dangers of unilateralism today). 
 125. See infra Part I.A. 
 126. Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Given Life Term by Jury over Link to 9/11, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, at A1. 
JOHNSON TRUJILLO_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:29:08 AM 
2007] IMMIGRATION REFORM 1395 
 
safety. Rather, removal of true terrorists would allow them to 
operate freely outside the country. 
Of course, some increased security measures are necessary 
to protect the United States. Immigration law and enforcement 
that considers security in addition to other goals is consistent 
with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report.127 
The report suggests the need for a better system of tracking 
noncitizens within the United States and cooperation with 
other nations in exchanging information about terrorist activ-
ity. It specifically recommends an entry/exit system recording 
who is present in the United States at any given point in time. 
A complete database remains in the works to track lawful im-
migrants and temporary visitors to the United States.128 Even 
when such a system is created, it would not account for the mil-
lions of undocumented immigrants living in the country. A 
tracking system cannot be effective if thousands, if not millions, 
of people—undocumented immigrants—are entering the coun-
try outside authorized channels and thus are not part of any 
record-keeping system.129 
Today, undocumented immigrants live and work under the 
government’s radar. They are effectively invisible, unidentified, 
and unknown. Keeping better track of the millions of undocu-
mented immigrants living in this country is essential if we are 
serious about protecting the nation from terrorist acts. The 
United States has no record of perhaps as many as twelve mil-
lion undocumented immigrants in the country.130 If one is in-
terested in better tracking of people in the United States, some 
effort must be made to maintain a record of this population. 
However, current law and policy ensures that undocumented 
immigrants remain invisible. Many states, for example, deny 
 
 127. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43, at 390. 
 128. See Visa Overstays: Can We Bar the Terrorist Door?: Hearing Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, 109th Cong. 20 (2006) (statement of Margaret D. Stock, Pro-
fessor, U.S. Military Academy at West Point) (listing U.S. General Account-
ability Office studies noting various deficiencies in computerized immigrant 
tracking systems used by the Department of Homeland Security); Editorial, 
Think All Illegal Immigrants Are Sneaking in? Think Again, USA TODAY, May 
2, 2006, at 12A (discussing flaws in the current tracking system); Nicole Gaou-
ette, U.S. Installs Visitor Tracking Stations, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at A17 
(mentioning the same effect); Spencer S. Hsu, Immigrant Processors Fall Be-
hind, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at A3 (same). 
 129. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (offering an estimate of 
11.5–12 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States). 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
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undocumented immigrants driver’s licenses,131 thereby denying 
them a basic identification document relied upon heavily by law 
enforcement authorities. 
To this end, the United States must work with other na-
tions to secure accurate intelligence about persons who seek 
entry into the United States. Better coordination between law 
enforcement agencies of the three North American govern-
ments would do much to improve the national security of the 
United States. Some steps have been taken but much more 
work remains to be done. 
II.  THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF TERRORISM 
CONCERNS ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 
AND IMMIGRATION REFORM   
September 11, 2001, represented a turning point in the de-
bate over immigration reform in the United States. The horri-
ble human losses of that day halted in its tracks the discussion 
of any easing of immigration restrictions.132 Moreover, the fear 
of terrorism, feeding off of a general tendency among many U.S. 
citizens to blame immigrants for the problems of the day, 
helped to create a general “close the border” mentality that 
commanded substantial support among the general public.133 
As a result, politicians from a wide variety of political persua-
sions endorsed some sort of border enforcement strategy.134 
A. A SHIFT IN THE TERMS OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM 
DEBATE 
Before September 11, 2001, the U.S. and Mexican govern-
ments were seriously discussing entering into a migration ac-
cord that would have regularized labor migration between the 
two nations.135 Similarly, immigrant rights advocates appeared 
 
 131. See Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immi-
grants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 216–17 (2004); María 
Pabón López, More Than A License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of 
Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 95 (2004); see also Sylvia 
R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, the “War on Terrorism,” and Immigrants: Legal 
Challenges Post 9/11, 67 MO. L. REV. 775, 798–807 (2002) (analyzing the con-
troversy in Missouri over driver’s license eligibility for undocumented immi-
grants). 
 132. See infra Part II.A. 
 133. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Johnson, supra note 78, at 866–67. 
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to be close to convincing Congress to ameliorate some of the 
harshest provisions of the 1996 immigration reforms.136 Both 
reform efforts stopped in their tracks on September 11, as the 
United States immediately became preoccupied with public 
safety and national security. Since then, the focus in reforming 
U.S. immigration law and policy has been on fortifying the bor-
ders with border fences, providing additional officers and re-
sources to the Border Patrol, and related measures; regulariz-
ing the flow of migrants from Mexico to the United States, 
humane treatment of immigrants, and equitable enforcement of 
the immigration laws took a back seat.137 
September 11 thus had serious and detrimental long term 
consequences on positive immigration reform. It completely re-
versed the momentum of the debate, shifting it from possible 
liberalization of admissions and easing of removal and deten-
tion to stricter border controls, narrower admissions criteria, 
and harsher detention and removal proposals. Many of the 
most popular proposals would have restricted migration from 
many different countries, and were in no way limited to exclud-
ing Arab and Muslim noncitizens.138 Immigrant advocates 
moved from making a concerted effort at advocating for positive 
immigration reform to devoting energies and resources toward 
defending against the passage of punitive immigration laws.139 
As Professor Enid Trucios-Haynes correctly observed, 
Immigration dominates policy discussions in the post-September 11, 
2001 world in a manner that has distorted traditional issues and con-
cerns relating to noncitizens. To some, the perception or reality of po-
rous U.S. borders requires the most strenuous methods of border en-
forcement. In the eyes of many, immigration reform proposals since 
2001 have focused exclusively on enforcement without sufficient ac-
knowledgment of the human consequences on the noncitizens, both au-
thorized and unauthorized, throughout our community.140 
In a comment consistent with the tenor of the current im-
migration debate, Senator John Cornyn emphasized that the 
debate over immigration reform “is . . . first and foremost about 
 
 136. See Hines, supra note 7, at 21; see also supra text accompanying notes 
29–31 (discussing the harsh effects of the 1996 immigration reform laws). 
 137. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 138. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 135–37. 
 140. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Civil Rights, Latinos, and Immigration: Cyber-
cascades and Other Distortions in the Immigration Reform Debate, 44 
BRANDEIS L.J. 637, 638 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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our Nation’s security. In a post-9/11 world, border security is 
national security.”141 
Similarly, conservative pundits Patrick Buchanan and Mi-
chelle Malkin have made incendiary arguments on the need to 
close the borders in the war on terror.142 Such fears unfortu-
nately have generated some of the push for immigration re-
form. Although the threat of terrorism stemming from ordinary 
immigration into the United States has been exaggerated, the 
security arguments provide insights into the kinds of concerns 
held by many U.S. citizens. It goes without saying that, in 
2005–06, national security concerns greatly influenced the dis-
cussion of immigration reform.143 
The Sensenbrenner bill, passed by the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives in December 2005, perhaps was the most extreme 
enforcement-only immigration reform proposal.144 Among other 
things, the bill would have made the mere status of being an 
undocumented immigrant a felony subject to imprisonment as 
well as deportation from the United States, and apparently 
would have allowed for the imposition of criminal sanctions on 
persons who provided humanitarian assistance to undocu-
mented immigrants. The Sensenbrenner bill’s “close the bor-
der” approach is consistent with the national security emphasis 
prevailing in the debate over immigration in recent years. 
B. THE FIXATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY HAS SKEWED THE 
DEBATE OVER IMMIGRATION REFORM. 
We offer two competing models of immigration law and pol-
icy, which we call “immigration monism” and “immigration plu-
ralism.” Both models persist throughout the history and devel-
opment of U.S. immigration law, with each model at times 
dominant, while at other times, subservient. 
 
 141. 152 CONG. REC. S2551 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Cornyn) (emphasis added). 
 142. See PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE THIRD WORLD 
INVASION AND CONQUEST OF AMERICA 245–70 (2006); MICHELLE MALKIN, IN-
VASION: HOW AMERICA STILL WELCOMES TERRORISTS, CRIMINALS, AND OTHER 
FOREIGN MENACES TO OUR SHORES 3–28 (2002); see also Jan C. Ting, Unobjec-
tionable but Insufficient—Federal Initiatives in Response to the September 11 
Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1157–62 (2002) (questioning 
whether the United States had done enough in the war on terror). 
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
 144. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control 
Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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1. Immigration Monism 
Immigration monism postulates that all possible objectives 
of immigration law ultimately collapse into the sole goal of na-
tional security, broadly defined. Immigration monism has a 
long, if inglorious, history. It marred the birth of federal immi-
gration law: Congress’s regulation of Chinese migration in the 
1880’s and the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent announce-
ment of the “plenary power doctrine” as necessary to protect 
the United States from “foreign aggression” and corruption of 
the national identity, which the Court characterized as a na-
tional security concern.145 In that foundational instance, the 
United States deployed immigration law as a weapon of na-
tional self-definition and self-defense. 
The monistic view considers the protection of national sov-
ereignty to be the primary goal of immigration law. All other 
goals, whether economic, social, or political, are secondary to 
the defense of the nation-state. The monistic project involves 
defining and enforcing strong borders, creating categories of 
“insider” and “other,” subsidizing the insider by penalizing the 
other, and creating mechanisms strictly limiting the ability of 
others to become insiders. Immigration monism is entirely con-
sistent with what has been termed “classical immigration law,” 
in which the power of the executive and legislative branches 
reigns supreme, with the judiciary possessing a limited role in 
reviewing the immigration laws; although incursions have been 
made, classical immigration law has resisted the revolution in 
constitutional rights over the twentieth century.146 
Since September 11, 2001, immigration monism has pre-
dominated in U.S. immigration law and policy. Recent immi-
gration legislation, including the USA Patriot Act,147 the Home-
 
 145. See supra Part I.A. Similar arguments have been made in modern 
times, with Samuel Huntington being the most prominent academic arguing 
for restricting immigration from Mexico to preserve the national identity. See 
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NA-
TIONAL IDENTITY (2004). For criticism of Huntington’s arguments, see Kevin 
R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural Nation: The 
Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347 
(2005). 
 146. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (analyzing the apparent shift in “classical immigra-
tion law” focusing on sovereignty to one more consistent with a liberal concep-
tion of individual rights). 
 147. See Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Johnson, 
supra note 78, at 855–57 (discussing certain immigration provisions of the 
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land Security Act creating the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity,148 the REAL ID Act,149 and the Secure Fence Act of 
2006,150 focus almost exclusively on border enforcement, with 
little attention paid to the economic, political, and social goals 
of immigration law and policy. We hear the echoes of immigra-
tion monism in the remarkable consensus, both in Congress 
and on Main Street, in favor of a “close the border” approach to 
immigration reform, including more Border Patrol officers and 
the allocation of ever-increasing resources to border enforce-
ment.151 The plenary power doctrine, which some commenta-
tors not long before September 11 claimed to be in its death 
throes,152 was a central tool of the Bush administration in seek-
ing to justify various border enforcement and national security 
measures.153 
2. Immigration Pluralism 
On the other hand, immigration pluralism appreciates that 
immigration law and policy serves many goals, none of which 
have a structural claim to superiority. Along with the impor-
tant goal of national security, immigration law also must serve 
the legitimate economic, political, and social needs of the 
United States. For example, universities and research institu-
tions benefit, along with the entire U.S. economy (through 
technological innovation), from the admission of foreign na-
tional students and scholars. For that reason, educational insti-
tutions have vocally criticized the tightening of visa require-
 
Patriot Act). 
 148. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 
2135 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.). 
 149. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 150. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 151. See supra Part I. 
 152. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical 
Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in 
Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 32–40 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, Explain-
ing the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339–42 (2002). 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59; see also Johnson, supra 
note 28, at 870 (“To paraphrase Mark Twain, any claims of the [plenary 
power] doctrine’s death have been greatly exaggerated. Though perhaps not as 
potent as in days past, the plenary power doctrine survives to this day and re-
surfaces frequently in Supreme Court and lower court decisions.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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ments by the U.S. government as part of the war on terror.154 
Sectors of the U.S. economy dependent on highly-skilled labor 
demand concessions from U.S. immigration law in securing 
workers.155 
While the monist sees the nation as a sovereign to be de-
fined and defended, the immigration pluralist sees the nation 
as a composite of overlapping societies. The role of the nation-
state, according to the pluralist view, is to balance the compet-
ing claims of these various societies. The task is not always 
easy, but it is essential to the formation of sound public policy, 
including sound immigration policy. 
Immigration pluralism can be seen in some of the more 
constructive immigration reforms of the last few decades. The 
Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),156 the Im-
migration Act of 1990,157 and the Legal Immigration Family 
Equity Act of 2000 (LIFE),158 for example, offered multi-faceted, 
multipurpose reforms to the U.S. immigration laws. IRCA both 
granted an amnesty (to normalize the status of long-time 
undocumented residents), and created a regime of employer 
sanctions (to limit the attraction of jobs that draw the undocu-
mented workers to the United States).159 The Immigration Act 
of 1990 eliminated outdated exclusions regulating political ide-
 
 154. See, e.g., Sylvia H. Kless, We Threaten National Security by Discourag-
ing the Best and Brightest Students from Abroad, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 
8, 2004, at B9; see also Michael A. Olivas, The War on Terrorism Touches the 
Ivory Tower—Colleges and Universities After September 11: An Introduction, 
30 J.C. & U.L. 233, 236 (2004). 
 155. See S. Mitra Kalita, For Green Card Applicants, Waiting is the Hard-
est Part, WASH. POST, July 23, 2005, at D1; Chris Nuttall, Intel Chief Calls for 
Easing of Visa Curbs, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, at 6. 
 156. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.); see LEGOMSKY, supra note 16, at 1209 (noting that the 
law included both legalization programs and employer sanctions). 
 157. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2920 and in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 158. Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762. In 2000, Congress also passed the 
American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251, which eased restrictions on various types of em-
ployment visas. See Susan Martin et al., U.S. Immigration Policy: Admission 
of High Skilled Workers, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 619, 628–34 (2002); Enid Tru-
cios-Haynes, Temporary Workers and Future Immigration Policy Conflicts: 
Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for Global Human Capi-
tal, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 967, 1008–13 (2002). 
 159. However, employer sanctions, as implemented, failed to successfully 
deter employers from employing undocumented workers. See Michael J. Wish-
nie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment 
Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2007). 
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ology and sexual preference while also creating new employ-
ment and diversity visa programs. The LIFE Act, among other 
things, eased the restrictions on noncitizens seeking to regular-
ize their immigration status. 
Immigration pluralism, which recognizes the many goals of 
immigration law and policy, strives to balance many competing 
goals and objectives rather than to focus myopically on national 
security. In an era of much-heralded globalization and the in-
creasing integration of the world economy, pluralistic ap-
proaches to immigration regulation are especially important. 
To this end, in the pursuit of economic development in the 
United States and Mexico, the movement of labor between the 
United States and Mexico should be normalized, not milita-
rized.160 Put differently, we should have Greyhound buses 
bringing workers from Mexican towns to the United States, not 
bloodhounds hunting down migrants along the U.S./Mexico 
border.161 
3. The Current Immigration Reform Debate 
Some activists and policy-makers seize on fears over terror-
ism to advocate restrictionist reforms, including those directed 
at undocumented immigration from Mexico.162 The U.S. gov-
ernment appears ready to commit tremendous resources to the 
construction of a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico, and 
other border enforcement measures have gained great popular-
ity.163 As one commentator observed, “enhanced border en-
forcement is a certain component for any [immigration reform] 
 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 94–115. 
 161. See Bernard Trujillo, Bloodhounds or Greyhounds: Reconsidering Op-
timal Border Policy for Regulating Mexican Migration to the United States 
(working paper, 2007). 
 162. See, e.g., Michael M. Hethmon, Diversity, Mass Immigration, and Na-
tional Security After 9/11—An Immigration Reform Movement Perspective, 66 
ALB. L. REV. 387, 405–11 (2003). 
 163. See, e.g., Justin C. Glon, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors:” Na-
tional Security and Terrorism—Time to Fence in Our Southern Border, 15 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 349, 361–71 (2005) (endorsing a border fence); Sunil 
Varghese, Developments in the Legislative Branch, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 157, 
157 (2005) (discussing proposals in Congress for a border fence because of na-
tional security, rising illegal immigration, and increasing crime along the bor-
der). The Secure Fence Act of 2006 authorized the future appropriation of 
funds to build a seven-hundred-mile wall along the U.S./Mexico border. See 
Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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legislation.”164 In a similar overemphasis on enforcement, At-
torney General John Ashcroft found that national security con-
cerns justified the detention of a Haitian asylum seeker with-
out bond even though the noncitizen in question had no links 
whatsoever to terrorism: “[T]here is a substantial prospect that 
the release of such aliens into the United States would . . . en-
courage future surges in illegal migration by sea . . . . [S]urges 
in such illegal migration by sea . . . injure national security by 
diverting valuable Coast Guard and [Department of Defense] 
resources from counterterrorism and homeland security re-
sponsibilities.”165 
Unfortunately, national security today dominates the de-
bate over virtually any immigration-related measure. In Cali-
fornia, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger emphasized national 
security concerns as justifying repeal of the law and vetoing 
others laws that would have allowed undocumented immi-
grants to be eligible to secure driver’s licenses.166 The federal 
REAL ID Act167 later created uniform national standards gov-
erning the issuance of driver’s licenses by the states. However, 
a system in which millions of people who live and work in this 
country but lack basic identification cannot conceivably benefit 
national security or aid ordinary criminal law enforcement. 
One important fact should be highlighted. Throughout the 
immigration reform debates of 2005–06, in which terrorism 
fears often arose, there was a myopic focus on bolstering en-
forcement along the southern border with Mexico despite the 
fact that there is no evidence of terrorists entering the United 
States through Mexico. Nor is there any evidence of any special 
need from a national security standpoint to greatly fear migra-
tion from Mexico. A 2006 study found that no known noncitizen 
accused of terrorist acts in the United States came from the 
South. Although proposals for increased border enforcement 
along the U.S. southern border with Mexico have been claimed 
to improve national security, one study concluded that “[n]ot 
 
 164. Katherine L. Vaughns, Restoring the Rule of Law: Reflections on Fix-
ing the Immigration System and Exploring Failed Policy Choices, 5 U. MD. J. 
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 151, 181 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 165. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 579 (A.G. 2003); see Judy Amorosa, 
Note, Dissecting In re D-J-: The Attorney General, Unchecked Power, and the 
New National Security Threat Posed by Haitian Asylum Seekers, 38 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 263 (2005) (analyzing the ruling). 
 166. See Johnson, supra note 131, at 232–35. 
 167. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (to be codified 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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one terrorist has entered the United States from Mexico.”168 Fur-
thermore, “despite media alarms about terrorists concealed in 
the illegal traffic crossing the Mexican border, not a single 
[person charged or convicted of terrorist acts, or killed in such 
acts] entered from Mexico.”169 
Ironically enough, the only terrorists in recent years who 
attempted to cross physical borders on foot were from the 
North, with the so-called Millennium Bomber probably the 
most well-known.170 This demonstrates the need to focus to a 
greater extent on the United States’ northern border with Can-
ada, which is much more open, and much less militarized, than 
the southern border.171 The disparate treatment of the northern 
and southern borders regularly brings forth claims that some-
thing else besides border security, such as racial animus, is at 
work. 
As this discussion suggests, the nations of North America 
need to consider multilateral measures that improve security 
and address the difficult issues of managing—not halting—
migration.172 To this point, Congress has not seriously consid-
ered truly comprehensive immigration reform. Instead, border 
enforcement and more border enforcement have carried the 
day. This, we argue, is a mistake and fails to ensure that U.S. 
immigration law and policy satisfies the multiple goals that it 
must if the United States wants to remain politically, economi-
cally, and socially strong—and safe. 
  CONCLUSION   
Nobody, of course, can dispute that protecting the national 
security of the United States is an important public policy ob-
jective of the U.S. government in the modern world. As a na-
tion, the U.S. government, consistent with our constitutional 
values and commitment to freedom and equality, should do all 
 
 168. Peter Beinart, The Wrong Place to Stop Terrorists, WASH. POST, May 
4, 2006, at A25 (discussing a study making this finding) (emphasis added). 
 169. Robert S. Leiken & Steven Brooke, The Quantitative Analysis of Ter-
rorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration, 18 TERRORISM & POL. VIO-
LENCE 1, 2 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
 170. See Sam Howe Verhovek, 2nd Man Sought for Questioning in Bomb 
Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, § 1, at 42; Scott Sunde & Elaine Porterfield, 
Wider Bomb Plot Possible, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 18, 1999, at 
A1. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 100–03. 
 172. See supra Part I.B.2–3. 
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that it can to make the nation safe. We as a nation, however, 
should expect and demand that security measures must be cal-
culating, fair, and effective—not overbroad, arbitrary, capri-
cious, and ineffective. 
Since September 11, 2001, the United States unfortunately 
has seen national security concerns skew immigration law and 
enforcement. This development is evident in the discussion 
over immigration reform. The nation must work to avoid the 
distortion of the debate and reject measures that focus myopi-
cally on border enforcement. Border enforcement-only policies 
are not realistic and simply will not be effective at significantly 
reducing undocumented immigration. Closing the borders at 
this time in U.S. history is nothing less than a pipedream.173 
The nation instead desperately needs a rational and compre-
hensive approach to immigration law and enforcement. 
True antiterrorism measures might include such steps as 
providing identification of some sort to undocumented immi-
grants, a new earned legalization program for long-time un-
documented residents, and better tracking of immigrants and 
temporary visitors. At a most fundamental level, the United 
States needs an immigration policy that, as President Bush has 
advocated,174 ensures that there no longer is a shadow popula-
tion of millions of undocumented persons living in the United 
States.175 This is not safe, or sensible, and is inconsistent with 
our constitutional values. 
Some relatively easy legal steps could be taken in the short 
term to improve public safety. Professor Bill Hing, for example, 
has suggested the need for better intelligence strategies and le-
galization of undocumented immigrants to bring millions of 
people out of the shadows.176 Along these lines, immigrants can 
prove helpful in the war on terror. Law enforcement officers 
need to work with, rather than alienate, immigrant communi-
ties through enforcing the immigration laws. Immigration poli-
cies thus are critical in the promotion of national security. 
 
 173. See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 245–52 
(2003). 
 174. See Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, 20 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 931 (May 22, 2006) (“[I]llegal immigrants live in the shadows of 
our society. . . . [T]he vast majority . . . are decent people who work hard, sup-
port their families, practice their faith, and lead responsible lives. They are a 
part of American life, but they are beyond the reach and protection of Ameri-
can law.”). 
 175. See supra text accompanying note 9–10. 
 176. See Hing, supra note 64, at 207–16. 
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Making undocumented immigrants eligible for driver’s licenses 
might well improve security.177 Unfortunately, a preoccupation 
with national security has poisoned the debate over driver’s li-
censes, just as it has with immigration reform generally.178 At a 
time when the United States needs to retool and revisit its im-
migration laws to protect national security, as well as to pro-
mote legitimate political, social, and economic goals, the nation 
appears to be the slave of fear. Because fear to this point has 
prevailed, the United States has failed to thoughtfully reform 
its immigration laws and, among other things, improve its na-
tional security. 
National security concerns, however, should not bar the 
United States from considering economic, political, and social 
aims in the formulation of immigration law and policy. Well-
crafted, manageable, and effective policies must carefully weigh 
all facets of immigration and its impacts on the United States. 
Along these lines, as the national experience since September 
11, 2001, has made clear, it is not necessarily the case that ef-
forts to close the borders will result in a more secure America. 
Rather, a balanced immigration system can make for a safer 
nation as well as one that better realizes the maximum eco-
nomic, political, and social benefits from immigrants and immi-
gration. 
 
 177. See DONALD KERWIN & MARGARET D. STOCK, NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND IMMIGRATION POLICY: RECLAIMING TERMS, MEASURING SUCCESS, AND 
SETTING PRIORITIES 45–46 (2006). 
 178. See supra Part II. 
